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Finnur Ulf Dellsén - Prófessor

Finnur Ulf Dellsén

–

Hugvísindasvið

Finnur Ulf DellsénHann/Hans

Prófessor

Prófessor í heimspeki

Aðsetur
Gimli / G-310
Sími
5254391 8667247
Tölvupóstur
fud [hjá] hi.is

Starfseining
Deild heimspeki, sagnfræði og fornleifafræði
Vefsíða
http://www.finnurdellsen.com/

ORCID vefsíða
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4989-4204
Rannsóknagátt – Finnur Ulf Dellsén

Útgefið efni

2024

Probabilifying reflective equilibriumSynthese

2023

Scientific progress: By-whom or for-whom?Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Would Disagreement Undermine Progress?The Journal of Philosophy

2022

Thinking about Progress: From Science to PhilosophyNoûs
Excessive Testimony: When Less Is MorePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
The Noetic Approach: Scientific Progress as Enabling UnderstandingNew Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress
Scientific Progress without ProblemsScientific Understanding and Representation
Scientific Progress without Justification Scientific Understanding and Representation

2021

Rational understanding: toward a probabilistic epistemology of acceptabilitySynthese
Consensus versus Unanimity: Which Carries More Weight?The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Disagreement in science: introduction to the special issueSynthese
We Owe It to Others to Think for OurselvesEpistemic Autonomy
Understanding scientific progress: the noetic accountSynthese
Explanatory Consolidation: From ‘Best’ to ‘Good Enough’Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Are there really no such things as theories?Metascience

2020

Gildi vísinda og gildin í vísindum — á tímum heimsfaraldursSkírnir
The epistemic impact of theorizing: generation bias implies evaluation biasPhilosophical Studies
Að treysta sérfræðingum. Hvar, hvenær og hvers vegna?Ritið

2019

Scientiﬁc Realism in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Seven Sciences and HPSPhilosophy of Science
Should scientific realists embrace theoretical conservatism?Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Divergent Perspectives on Expert Disagreement: Preliminary Evidence from Climate Science, Climate Policy, Astrophysics, and Public OpinionEnvironmental Communication

2018

Promotion as contrastive increase in expected fitPhilosophical Studies
Beyond Explanation: Understanding as Dependency ModellingThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
The epistemic value of expert autonomyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptanceSynthese
The heuristic conception of inference to the best explanationPhilosophical Studies
Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best ExplanationNotre Dame Philosophical Review
Understanding in epistemology and philosophy of science: a complicated relationshipMetascience
Scientific progress: Four accountsPhilosophy Compass
Scientific Progress, Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to ParkJournal for General Philosophy of Science

2017

The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's AssJournal of the American Philosophical Association
A classic of Bayesian confirmation theoryMetascience
Ted Poston, Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 208 pp., €88.39 (Hardback), ISBN 9781137012258.Dialectica
Certainty and Explanation in Descartes's Philosophy of ScienceHOPOS: Journal of the International Society for History and Philosophy of Science
When Expert Disagreement Supports the ConsensusAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Reactionary Responses to the Bad Lot ObjectionStudies in History and Philosophy of Science
Abductively Robust InferenceAnalysis
Frá skoðunum til trúnaðar og aftur til bakaHugur

2016

Understanding without Justification or BeliefRatio
The Epistemic Significance of DisagreementThe Philosophical Quarterly
Gagnrýnin og vísindaleg hugsunSkírnir
Hlutdrægni í vísindumRitið
Reconstructed EmpiricismActa Anal
Realism and the absence of rivalsSynthese
Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understandingStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
There May Yet be Non-causal Explanations (of Particular Events)Journal for General Philosophy of Science

2015

Tvö viðhorf til vísindalegrar þekkingar -- eða eitt?Ritið -- tímarit Hugvísindastofnunar
Explanatory Rivals and the Ultimate ArgumentTheoria

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